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Abstract
This study examines a newly introduced DRG system in Indonesia. We use secondary data 
for 2015 and 2017 from Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN), a patient level dataset for 
Indonesia created in 2014 to record public and private hospitals’ claims to the national 
health insurance system to investigate whether there is an association between changes in 
tariffs paid and the severity of inpatient activity recorded in hospitals. We find a consist-
ent small, positive and statistically significant correlation between changes in tariffs and 
changes in concentration of activity, indicating discretionary but limited coding behaviour 
by hospitals. The results indicate that reducing price differentials may mitigate discretion-
ary coding, but that the benefits of this are limited and need to be compared to the potential 
risk of having to rebase all prices upwards.
Keywords Prospective payment system · Diagnosis-related groups · Clinical coding · 
Indonesia · Insurance · Health
JEL Codes C1 (Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General) · I13 
(Health Insurance · Public and Private) · 18 (Government Policy · Regulation · Public 
Health)
Introduction
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) (Office of Technology Assessment, 1983) based pay-
ment systems reimburse hospitals for the services they provide according to a previously 
defined fee for each DRG (Langenbrunner et al., 2010). They are advocated as a means of 
ensuring accountability and measurement of hospital activity and have been shown across 
a number of jurisdictions to improve efficiency and increase activity without negatively 
impacting on quality (Busse et  al., 2011). They are, however, also associated with unin-
tended consequences (Cots et  al., 2011), including the intentional manipulation of the 
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coding of patients by hospitals to increase their income (Steinbusch et al., 2007). This pro-
cess of changing coding has been discussed by a number of different terms; gaming, upcod-
ing and DRG ‘creep’ being the most common. In all cases the concern is that patients are 
assigned to a DRG with a higher tariff than the one to which they would be assigned based 
on their diagnoses (Kirch, 2008) with this being facilitated by the fact that DRG systems 
often use the severity of a patient’s condition, as determined by the provider, as a part of 
classification for payment. This phenomena has been discussed since the 1980s (Simborg, 
1981), including analyses of its importance in driving hospital payments in the US (Carter 
et  al., 1990; Steinwald & Dummit, 1989) and the potential solutions (Kuhn & Siciliani, 
2008, 2013). A key driver of decisions within DRG-based payment are the relative prices 
of the different DRGs and this also applies to discretionary coding choices. Where a more 
severe condition has a high price relative to its low severity counterpart, there is a stronger 
incentive for hospitals to classify patients as high severity cases.
The setting for this study is Indonesia’s DRG system. In 2014 Indonesia introduced a 
national health insurance system, called Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) managed by 
the Social Security Administering Body of Health (BPJS Kesehatan). The JKN is the unifi-
cation of four existing types of health insurance: (1) Jamkesmas – the government-financed 
health insurance programme targeting the poor and near-poor segment of the population, 
(2) Askes – the health insurance scheme for civil servants and pensioners, (3) Jamsostek 
– the insurance scheme for formal sector workers, and (4) Jamkesda – the local health 
insurance funded by local government budget. JKN initially covered 47% of the Indonesian 
population in 2014, increasing to 53% in 2015, 61% in 2016, 67% in 2017 and to 75% in 
2018 (Agustina et al., 2019).
Before JKN was introduced (in 2012), the utilisation of inpatient services was low with 
only 1.9% of the Indonesian population accessing them and bed-occupancy rates were 
around 60% in 2015 (Mahendradhata et al., 2017). Inpatient utilization of the Indonesian 
population under JKN increased to 3.1% in 2017 and 3.5% in 2018 (DJSN dan BPJS Kes-
ehatan, 2020).
At the same time as JKN was introduced, a DRG-based payment system for hospitals 
was established covering both outpatient and inpatient services. This system, called Indo-
nesian Case Base Groups (INA-CBG), had 789 categories for inpatients group and 288 
categories for outpatient groups (Minister of Health, 2014b). The 789 categories for inpa-
tients represent 263 DRGs with three severity levels each based on comorbidities and com-
plications (I = mild—no comorbidities/complications, II = moderate—mild complications/
comorbidities, III = high—major comorbidities/complications). The allocation of patients 
to DRGs under INA-CBGS followed the United Nations University (UNU) casemix 
grouper. Ministry of Health has started to collaborate with professional associations to 
develop the Indonesian grouper (INA-Grouper) which reflects patterns of clinical practice 
and resource use in Indonesia since 2016. In the future the INA-grouper will be used to 
replace the UNU-Grouper. While Tariff per INACBGS is created from the average cost per 
department, cost per day is assumed to be the same for the same department. The alloca-
tion of costs from intermediate cost to final cost is based on the number of days of care and 
visits.
The present study aims to examine evidence of discretionary coding in the coding in 
JKN utilising a crucial feature of this system; that the prices within it were adjusted since 
their introduction. With any new system, hospitals can be expected to adapt their report-
ing to generate more income. Anticipating this, price-setters in Indonesia adjusted the 
price differentials between high and low severity conditions but did so differentially across 
DRGs. The hypothesis we seek to test is that this led to lower incidence of reporting of 
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high severity cases, according to the extent of the reduction in the price differential. Con-
firmation that hospitals respond in this way is evidence both of discretionary coding taking 
place and of the ability of setting differential prices to regulate that. To test this hypothesis 
we analyse data exploiting the fact that the relative prices for different severities of condi-
tions were subject to revision between 2015 and 2017.
Whilst discretionary coding has been extensively discussed and evidenced across a 
number of health care systems especially in the US Medicare system, existing studies rely 
on innovations in the coding system to consider whether increasing the number of classi-
fications results increased reporting of severity (Cook & Averett, 2020). These studies are 
largely concerned with the impact of incentives on coding within specific DRGs whereas 
we consider an entire DRG system and exploit differential changes between DRGs. We are 
thus able to give a system-level view of discretionary coding. Most DRG systems where 
upcoding has been examined are well-established, for example across a number of Euro-
pean countries (Busse et  al., 2011), and have price setting that is focussed on matching 
financial resources to costs. The system we study is still in its infancy and provides an unu-
sual instance of price-setters anticipating upcoding and pre-emptively adjusting prices to 
control it. Hence our approach is novel both in respect of its whole system focus and its use 
of price variation within a given DRG framework. The results support our hypothesis; we 
consistently find a small, positive and statistically significant correlation between changes 
in tariffs and changes in concentration of activity, indicating discretionary but limited cod-
ing behaviour by hospitals. The results indicate that reducing price differentials may miti-
gate discretionary coding, but that the benefits of this are limited and need to be compared 
to the potential risk of having to rebase all prices upwards.
Indonesian case base groups (INA-CBG)
Under the JKN program, primary health care services are paid using capitation and non-
capitation while hospital services are paid using DRGs or namely as INA-CBG. A standard 
tariff for health care services within INA-CBG is regulated by the Indonesian Ministry of 
Health in consultation with other government bodies. There have been four versions of the 
DRG tariffs. The first standard tariff regulation was in 2013 (Minister of Health, 2013) and 
established that tariffs differed not only by services provided (DRG/severity level) but also 
by region, hospital type (denoted A, B, C or D), and the class of care to which the patient 
was entitled (in one of three categories 1, 2, and 3). The tariff was refined in 2014 (Minister 
of Health, 2014b). In 2016 there were two updates to the tariff (Minister of Health, 2016a, 
2016b), which added hospital ownership (public or private) to the determinants of the tar-
iff. Private hospitals have in general a 3% higher tariff than public hospital for all types of 
services (Minister of Health, 2016b). In summary, since the refinement in 2016, there are 
786 categories (262 DRGs with three severity levels each) for inpatient services and 289 
for outpatient and these all vary across five regions, four types of hospital, two modes of 
hospital ownership and the three patient driven classes of care.
The five regions represent the following provinces: Banten, DKI Jakarta, West Java, 
Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java (Region 1), West Sumatera, Riau, South Sumatera, 
Lampung, Bali and West Nusa Tenggara (Region 2), Aceh, North Sumatera, Jambi, Beng-
kulu, Bangka Belitung, Riau Island, West Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, 
Southeast Sulawesi, West Sulawesi, South Sulawesi and Gorontalo (Region 3), South 
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Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan (Region 4) and 
East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua and West Papua (Region 5).
Hospital type is a classification based on the range of services provided by a hospital, 
hospitals type A provide a wide range of subspecialist services, type B provide specialist 
services and limited subspecialist services, type C provide limited specialist services, and 
type D provide basic limited specialist services (at least internal medicine, surgery, pae-
diatric medicine, and obstetric services), general medicine and dental healthcare services 
(Mahendradhata et al., 2017; Minister of Health, 2014a). Teaching hospitals can be type A 
or type B.
The class of care on to which a patient is entitled varies according to the contributions 
(premiums) they make and the amenities (e.g. private room) they can access when admit-
ted to hospital; class 1 is the group with access to better amenities and class 3 has access 
to the most basic amenities. These groups are subject to different tariffs, which means that 
in a given hospital each DRG/severity has three tariffs, one for each of the classes of care. 
There is no policy of patient cost-sharing applied for services provided under JKN pol-
icy. Cost-sharing will only be applied if patients request an upgrade in class of care. For 
instance, patients who are enrolled in class of care 2 can request to get inpatient treatment 
in class 1, but will have to pay the tariff difference between class 1 and class 2. These 
upgrades are not captured in the data.
Methods
Since the JKN national health insurance system was introduced nationally, there is no 
untreated group, so we can only exploit the variation over time in the variables of interest. 
Not everyone was covered by the JKN when it was introduced, but we cannot use those not 
covered as a control group because data on claims is only collected for those covered by 
JKN.
We focus on the change in tariff that occurred in 2016 to investigate whether hospital 
activity composition changes in response to that change.
In a given year, the relationship between the activity concentration yihk and the relative 
prices x
ihk
 in DRG i in hospital h for patients in class of care k , controlling for the patients’ 
age and sex in DRG i in hospital h in class of care k , can be described as:
We analyse changes between two periods using a regression model in differences. Using 
Δ to denote the difference in a variable between two time periods, we write this model as:
where the dependent variable Δyihk,(t1,t0) is a measure of the change in the activity con-
centration (across different severities) in DRG i in hospital h for patients in class of care 
k between periods t0 and t1 , Δx
ihk,(t1,t0) is the variation in the relative prices for DRG i in 
hospital h for patients in class of care k between periods t0 and t1 and Δzihk,(t1,t0) is the vari-
ation in the proportion of patients in 5-year age bands and sex groups DRG i in hospital h 
in class of care k between periods t0 and t1.
To measure activity concentration, we consider two approaches, one based on the coding 
of each hospital and one based on the coding of a grouping of hospitals facing the same tariffs 
(1)yihk =  + xihk + zihk + ihk
(2)Δyihk,(t1,t0) = Δxihk,(t1,t0) + Δzihk,(t1,t0) + Δihk,(t1,t0)
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for a given DRG/class of care combination, i.e. hospitals in the same region, of the same type 
and same ownership.
The measure of activity concentration based only on a given hospital’s activity is the per-
centage of activity in the highest severity level (level III) in DRG i in hospital h for patients in 
class of care k . This does not take into account the overall distribution of activity, for example, 
for a DRG where no hospital has activity in severity level III (see section Data), all hospitals 
will have the same value for activity concentration, zero.
The measure of activity concentration based on the activity in a hospital group is the spe-
cialisation index (Daidone & D’Amico, 2009; Gaughan et al., 2012) in DRG i in hospital h for 
patients in class of care k , considering the severity levels s (I = mild, II = moderate, III = high) 
within the DRG as the activity groups. The specialisation index is based on a Gini Coefficient 
and ranges between zero, when a hospital’s activity is distributed as in the group of hospi-
tals facing the same tariffs, and one, when hospital activity is fully specialised in one severity 
level. To simplify interpretation of results, we rescale this ratio for it to range between 0 and 
100. The specialisation index shows us whether a hospital’s activity is more concentrated than 
in the group of hospitals facing the same tariffs; concentration can happen in any severity 
level, for example, a hospital with all its activity in severity level I is as specialised as a hos-
pital with all its activity in severity level III. We interpret more concentration as indicative of 
less dispersion in coding of severity.
To measure relative prices we use the ratio between the highest and the lowest tariff for 
DRG i for patients in class of care k among hospitals in the same group, i.e. in the same 
region, of the same type and same ownership; the highest (lowest) tariff will be that of the 
highest (lowest) severity level for which there is activity in the hospital group, irrespective of 
whether one specific hospital records activity in them. For all regressions finding a statistically 
significant coefficient on the price variable is indicative of discretionary coding.
If the distribution of activity in respect of severity in 2015 was determined solely by 
patients’ need and assuming that any change in need over a short period of 2 years can be 
captured by our control variables then finding that the variation in the distribution of activity 
within a DRG is correlated with the change in the tariff for that DRG indicates that hospitals 
are responding to the change in tariff through their coding.
In all regressions we control for patient composition in terms of age and sex. For each 
hospital, we calculate the proportion of patients in a set of 5-year age groups (0–5, 6–10, …, 
71–75, 76–80, 81 +) and the proportion of male patients in a given DRG i and class of care k 
combination.
The population coverage of JKN increased between 2015 (53%) and 2017 (67%) (Agus-
tina et al., 2019), which could have an impact when comparing activity levels on these years. 
However, our focus is on the variation in activity between the 2 years, so we do not expect this 
increase in coverage to affect our methodology because even if the increase in coverage led 
more low (high) severity patients to have access to health care, this increase in activity in the 
low (high) severity level should not be correlated to the tariffs faced by hospitals.
Data analysis was performed using Stata 16 (StataCorp, 2019).
Data
Data were derived from the Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) dataset, a patient level data-
set created in 2014 to record public and private hospitals’ claims to the national health insur-
ance which has previously been used for research, mostly about healthcare utilization and 
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evaluation on the hospital payment system (Ng et al., 2019). It has not been used to study 
upcoding previously (Ng et al., 2019).
Even though JKN exists since 2014, we only use data for 2015 and 2017. The 2014 data 
was not used as the refinement of the dataset lasted until the start of 2015, i.e. data was not 
submitted consistently by all hospitals in 2014 (Ng et al., 2019). While, in 2016 tariffs changed 
twice, in October and December, so data includes claims for different tariffs. JKN changed 
the way it makes data available since 2018, providing only a 1% sample of claims. Data for 
2015 and 2017 allow us to compare activity under two different tariff versions. The data were 
extracted at the end of the year 2018. Since claims are processed between 2 months and 1 year 
after the admission (Ng et  al., 2019), it is possible for some claims to be incurred but not 
reported (IBNR) in late 2017. In 2018 the maximum time to submit claims was reduced to 
6 months, which indicates improved quality of the submissions, as hospitals are expected to be 
able to submit correct data in a reduced time frame.
The patient level data is aggregated to observations by hospital, DRG, severity level and 
class of care. There are 259 DRGs, three severity levels, 2405 hospitals and three classes of 
care. If all hospitals delivered all types of activity to all classes of care, there would be more 
than five million (the product of 262 DRGs, 3 severity levels, 2,405 hospitals and 3 classes 
of care) observations. In practice the data includes 990,097 hospital/DRG/severity level/class 
of care combinations, of which almost one third do not have activity in 2015 and almost one 
quarter have no activity in 2017. Hospital/DRG/severity level/class of care combinations with 
no activity in 1 year are more likely to be in private hospitals and in hospitals type D and less 
likely to be in hospitals type B, there are no differences across regions.
Not all hospitals record activity in all severity levels within a DRG, around 7% have no 
activity in the middle severity level (II) and around 14% have no activity in the highest sever-
ity level (III), and 6% of them have all their activity in the lowest severity level (I). Addition-
ally, hospitals do not record activity in all classes of care, around 7%, 5% and 3% of them have 
no activity in the class of care with the highest (class of care 1), middle (class of care 2) and 
lowest (class of care 3) tariffs, respectively, and a small proportion of hospitals have all their 
activity in one class of care (1% in class of care 1, 1% in class of care 2 and 4% in class of care 
3).
Tariffs are reported in currency (Indonesian Rupiah, IDR) of year 2017, therefore the varia-
tion we observe is in real terms, not due to inflation between the 2 years.
To implement our methodology, we use the severity levels s within each DRG as the activ-
ity groups to calculate the two measures of yihk , the percentage of activity in the highest sever-
ity level and the specialisation index, and the measure of x
ihk
 , the ratio between the highest 
and the lowest tariff in a hospital group. This means that the relevant number of observations 
is that of hospital/DRG/class of care combinations, of which there are 581,369 observations.
The analysis dataset is not balanced, i.e. not all hospital/DRG/class of care combinations 
have activity in both years, around 18% of them do not have activity in 2015 and 28% do 
not have activity in 2017, which means that the variation between the 2 years can only be 
calculated for 54% of the hospital/DRG/class of care combination; the estimation sample has 
316,757 observations.




The tariff for a hospital depends on its region, type of care and ownership; there are 40 
possible combinations of region, type of care and ownership in each year (5 regions × 
4 types of care × 2 ownership). The tariff also depends on the class of care (kelas = 1, 2 
or 3) of the patient. This means that for each severity level in a DRG there can be more 
than 100 different tariffs, depending on the hospital and patient.
As an example of the variation of observed in the tariff between 2015 and 2017, we 
show the variation in tariff for public hospitals in region 1, with type of care A and 
patients in class of care 1. In Table 1, we see that for this group tariffs increased, on 
average, for all severity levels, but that there was a range of variation over the different 
DRGs and severity levels.
Our main explanatory variable is the variation in the ratio between the highest and 
the lowest tariff of the severity levels with activity within a DRG (1 indicates highest 
and lowest tariffs are the same, this happens when there is activity in only one severity 
level). Again, to simplify presentation, we focus on public hospitals in region 1, with 
type of care A and patients in class of care 1. Table 2 shows that in both years the high-
est tariffs are, on average twice as large as the lowest, ranging from them being equal 
(DRGs where only one severity level has activity) to the highest tariff being eight times 
as large as the lowest. In terms of variation, Table 2 shows that, on average, the differ-
ence between highest and lowest tariff decreased slightly between 2015 and 2017, with 
some DRGs showing larger increases/decreases between the 2 years.
Table 1  Tariff variation between 2015 and 2017. Public hospitals in region 1, type of care A. Patients in 






Min 25th Pctile Median 75th Pctile Max
Severity level I 215 10.77 − 56.50 − 13.00 13.10 13.10 567.40
Severity level II 194 8.81 − 56.50 − 5.75 13.10 13.10 218.16
Severity level III 163 6.74 − 72.34 − 16.92 3.98 13.10 291.38






Min 25th Pctile Median 75th Pctile Max
Tariff ratio
 2015 241 2.25 1 1.53 2.00 2.67 8.81
 2017 247 2.12 1 1.50 1.90 2.58 7.96
Tariff ratio variation
 2017–2015 236 − 0.13 − 4.71 − 0.45 − 0.00 0.00 5.73
 M. Chalkley et al.
1 3
Figure 1 shows the tariff ratio for both years for DRGs in the O chapter (maternity), 
where we can see that the ratio between highest and lowest tariff changes over time.
Table 3 shows the number of admissions in each year and how many of them are in the 
highest severity level. The decline in the percentage of patients classified as most severe 
from 6.05% to 5.46% can be related back to numbers of treatments in the Indonesian hos-
pital system; it equates to 39,468 fewer patients being classified as the most severe in 2017.
Table  4 shows the descriptive statistics for the estimation sample, i.e. hospital/DRG/
class of care combinations with activity in both years.
In terms of patient characteristics in the estimation sample, see Table 5, we can see that 
the patients admitted, overall and in severity level III, are similar in both years. The propor-
tion of admissions of young children (age 0–5 years) and oldest patients (81 +) increased 
and the proportion of admissions with patients aged 76–80 years decreased between 2015 
and 2017. The proportion of admissions with patients in class of care 1 (highest premi-
ums) decreased and the proportion of admission with patients in class of care 3 (lowest 
premiums) increased between 2015 and 2017. The severity levels in the data are based on 
all comorbidities in the hospital records, but we cannot provide descriptives regarding the 
number of comorbidities as our data extract does not include all of them; therefore there is 
Fig. 1  Ratio highest/lowest tariff by DRG. Public Hospitals in Region 1, Type of Care A. Patients in Class 
of Care 1. DRGs in O chapter (maternity)
Table 3  Number of admissions
2015 2017
Admissions 6,157,766 6,653,823
Admissions in severity level III 372,801 363,088
% in severity level III 6.05 5.46
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a risk that some of the variation is due to this unobserved characteristic, but comorbidities 
are implicit in the severity levels, which makes us think this risk is low.
A key element in Table  4 is the decline in the ratio of prices for highest and lowest 
severity patients. This is reduced on average by nearly 30% (84/291) between 2015 and 
2017 and therefore over the system as a whole represents a substantial reduction in the 
financial benefit to hospitals of classifying patients as severe. There is a corresponding 
reduction in the observed incidence of treatments categorised for severe patients. This is 
the case for both or our measures (the percentage of activity in the most severe category 
and the specialisation index). The percentage of activity in the most severe category in the 
estimation sample are slightly higher (around 0.6 percentage points) than in the full data 
(Table 3). The change in the specialisation index indicates that there is less variation in 
severity within hospital groupings in 2017 than in 2015, although the numerical magnitude 
of this difference is not easily interpretable. Our hypothesis is that both of these changes 
in severity will vary between hospitals and within groupings of hospitals according to the 
extent of the reduction in differential prices, where this reduction varies by DRG, hospital, 
and the patients’ class of care.
Regression results
Table 6 shows the regression results of estimating Eq.  (2) for all observations (left) and 
only for those that changed the composition of their activity (right) using as dependent 
variable the percentage of activity in the highest severity level. In both cases the change 
in the tariff, measured with the variation in the ratio between the highest and the lowest 
tariff in the hospital group, is statistically significant and positively correlated to changes in 
activity composition, measured as the variation of the percentage of activity in the highest 
severity. Hence the changes observed in Table 4 cannot be attributed to changing case mix 
or the composition of treatments undertaken by the healthcare system alone. The estimated 
coefficient indicates that a one point decrease in the ratio between highest and lowest tariff 
Table 4  Descriptive statistics—estimation sample
† Activity in Highest Severity Level is measured as the percentage of all activity in the highest severity level 
(III) in a given hospital/DRG/class of care combination
‡ Specialisation Index is rescaled to range between 0 (activity distributed across severity levels as hospital 
group average) to 100 (all activity in one severity level)
§ Tariff Ratios are normalised to 100, i.e. if the highest tariff is 50% higher than the lowest, this variable will 
take value 150
Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Activity in severity level III—2015 6.72 16.96 0 100
Activity in severity level III—2017 5.99 15.89 0 100
Δ Activity in highest severity  level† − 0.73 19.26 − 100 100
Specialisation index 2015 62.24 37.53 0 100
Specialisation index 2017 61.83 38.37 0 100
Δ Specialisation  index‡ − 0.41 44.09 − 100 100
Tariff ratio  2015§ 290.68 159.13 100 3,172.03
Tariff ratio  2017§ 206.85 76.76 100 1,183.39
Δ Tariff  ratio§ − 83.82 142.37 − 3,072.01 615.67
Number of observations 316,757
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is associated with a decrease of around 0.003 percentage points in the activity in the high-
est severity level (III). Hence, after controlling for patient ages and the changing case mix 
of DRGs, the decline from 291 to 207 (decrease of 84 points) in the average tariff differ-
ential is associated with a reduction of 15,517 patients being classified in the most serious 
category. As is common in a regression in differences, the over overall fit of the model 
Table 5  Patient characteristics – 
estimation sample
All admissions Severity level III 
admissions
2015 2017 2015 2017
Number of admissions 5,872,957 5,857,593 280,915 257,782
Age groups [% of admissions]
 0–5 10.44 13.27 9.88 10.17
 6–10 3.76 4.11 4.22 4.19
 11–15 3.27 3.00 3.14 2.79
 16–20 5.22 4.99 2.86 2.71
 21–25 7.00 7.13 2.95 2.69
 26–30 8.32 7.99 3.06 2.63
 31–35 8.71 8.02 3.84 3.15
 36–40 7.31 6.89 4.24 3.78
 41–45 6.36 5.99 5.36 5.13
 46–50 7.06 6.50 7.80 7.47
 51–55 7.52 7.26 9.93 10.05
 56–60 7.31 7.23 11.10 11.73
 61–65 6.24 6.28 10.29 11.06
 66–70 4.47 4.46 7.82 8.25
 71–75 3.60 3.37 6.69 6.56
 76–80 3.40 0.64 6.83 1.52
 81 + 0.00 2.88 0.00 6.12
Male [% of admissions] 41.78 42.16 53.35 52.86
Class of care [% of admissions]
 1 24.15 20.51 25.82 22.75
 2 27.13 27.83 21.80 21.10
 3 48.73 51.66 52.38 56.15
Table 6  Regression results—y : 
percentage of activity in highest 
severity level
Standard errors, clustered by hospital, in parenthesis
***Represents 1% significance
All Obs Δy ≠ 0
Δ Tariff ratio 0.0030*** 0.0096***
(0.0004) (0.0013)
Patients’ AGE AND SEx Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0040 0.0138
N 316,757 123,325
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(R-squared) is low. This is indicative of a large proportion of differences in the dependent 
variable being attributable to characteristics of hospitals that are differenced out. Running 
a regression in levels, such as in Eq. (1), typically exhibits an R-squared of 0.1. More rel-
evant in terms of the degree of explanation that Eq. (2) achieves is the fact that the price 
variable explains more than 39% of the total difference in the specialisation measure that is 
observed in Table 3.
Table 7 shows the regression results of estimating Eq. (2) for all observations (left) and 
only for those that changed the composition of their activity (right) using the specialisation 
index as dependent variable. In both cases the change in the tariff, measured with the varia-
tion in the ratio between the highest and the lowest tariff in the hospital group, is positively 
correlated to changes in activity composition over severity levels, measured as the speciali-
sation index. The coefficient indicates that a one point decrease in the ratio between highest 
and lowest tariff is associated with a decrease of around 0.005 points in the specialisation 
index. Referring to Table 4, this result is consistent with the observed reduction in the spe-
cialisation index (0.41), as it estimates it to be 0.42 (84 × 0.005). The results in the second 
column indicate, as expected, that the responsiveness to tariff changes is focused on a sub-
sample of hospitals and within that subsample the effect is larger.
These results indicate that decreases (increases) in relative tariffs are associated to 
decreased (increased) specialisation but they need to be interpreted with caution as the data 
is relatively noisy as there are hospital/DRG/class of care combinations with low levels of 
activity and many of them (46%) have activity in only 1 year.
Sub-sample analysis
We repeated the analysis focusing on sub-samples defined by hospital ownership, region, 
hospital type and class of care. Table 8 summarizes the sub-sample results, showing the 
overall coefficients for the variable of interest, Δ Tariff Ratio, and the (significant) coeffi-
cients in the different sub-samples. The overall nature of results is preserved over different 
settings but the magnitude of coefficients varies. For example, the coefficient for Δ Tar-
iff Ratio is larger in private hospitals than in public hospitals and it varies by region. For 
the hospital type offering most specialised services (A), there is no significant correlation 
between variations in the tariff and activity concentration, but there are some differences 
between the other hospital types. For different patient classes of care, there are less differ-
ences between them when using the proportion of activity in the highest severity level than 
when using the specialisation index.
Table 7  Regression results—y : 
specialisation index
Standard errors, clustered by hospital, in parenthesis
***Represents 1% significance
All Obs Δy ≠ 0
Δ Tariff ratio 0.0053*** 0.0088***
(0.0009) (0.001)
Patients’ age and sex Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0014 0.0027
N 316,757 223,897
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We also restricted the sample to the largest hospitals (i.e. with activity greater than the 
median) in each DRG/class of care combination. The results using the percentage of activity 
in severity level III as dependent variable are similar to those in the whole sample. Using the 
specialisation index as dependent variable, we observe differences, but we do not re-calculate 
the specialisation index in the restricted sample.
We also repeated the analysis excluding from the sample the observations where the ratio 
between the tariff for the lowest and highest severity level exceeds the 95th percentile of the 
distribution. The results show coefficients larger (around twice as large) than those observed in 
Tables 6 and 7.
Taken together the regression results indicate a consistent positive and statistically signifi-
cant correlation between the change in tariff ratio and both of our measures of severity of 
coding and thus indicate both discretionary coding behaviour by hospitals and that this varies 
according to the extent to which prices show dispersion across different severities.
Table 8  Regression results—subsamples
Table only shows estimators of the coefficient for Δ Tariff Ratio significant at the 5% level
y : Activity severity level III y : Specialisation index
All Obs Δy ≠ 0 All Obs Δy ≠ 0
Overall coefficient (Tables 6 and 7) 0.0030 0.0096 0.0053 0.0088
Hospital ownership
 Public 0.0011 0.0037 0.0046 0.0076
 Private 0.0060 0.0174 0.0065 0.0107
Region
 Region 1 0.0023 0.0074 0.0027 0.0044
 Region 2 0.0059 0.0193 0.0094 0.0151
 Region 3 0.0042 0.0148 0.0094 0.0154
 Region 4 – – 0.0496 0.0681
 Region 5 0.0149 0.0487 0.0221 0.034
Type of care
 A – – – –
 B 0.0035 0.0087 0.0052 0.0073
 C 0.0025 0.0090 - -
 D 0.0058 0.0287 0.0243 0.0433
Class of care (Kelas)
 1 0.0024 0.0081 - -
 2 0.0035 0.0121 0.0050 0.0091
 3 0.0032 0.0090 0.0095 0.0136
Providers with Activity > Median 0.0029 0.0081 0.0029 0.0043
Excluding outliers (> 95th pctile) 0.0061 0.0170 0.0116 0.0170
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Discussion
The phenomena of hospitals reporting conditions as more severe – upcoding – is a much-
discussed unintended consequence of the adoption of DRG systems. It implies that the 
financing cost of hospital services increases over time due to manipulation of the coding 
system by hospitals seeking higher reimbursement. Whilst most DRG systems have been 
observed to experience upcoding (or ‘creep’) over time it is difficult to separate the drivers 
of that as between increasing severity of illness and hospital behaviour. This is because in 
most systems, prices are calibrated to costs and innovation comes in the form of changing 
the number or definition of DRG to allow for increasing complexity of health conditions. 
Increased reported severity can therefore be a consequence of severely ill patients being 
correctly classified according to a new and more sensitive classification system. In contrast 
to this we study a system in which there has been explicit price variation and examine 
the response of reported severity to changing price differentials. This provides a novel and 
potentially informative indication of discretionary coding because if severity were purely 
a matter of patients’ health conditions, we would not expect reported severity to change as 
prices change. The numerical responsiveness of coding severity to prices differentials then 
gives an indication of how much influence price setters can have over discretionary coding. 
The present study uses an opportunity to implement this approach by examining data on 
a newly instigated DRG system in which price setting was proactively used to pre-empt a 
potential move to upcoding.
Our findings provide consistent evidence of discretionary coding in the Indonesian sys-
tem. Reductions in the price differential between most and least severe patients are associ-
ated with reductions in the proportion of patients recorded in the most severe category. 
This is true both overall and for different types of hospital, different payment categories 
of patient and across different regions. In all cases the finding is of statistically signifi-
cant associations in the direction expected. We further find evidence that the discrepancies 
between similar hospitals in terms of their coding are reduced when price differentials are 
reduced, which is suggestive of different hospitals being more or less prone to discretion-
ary coding, but these differences are alleviated when the financial incentive to up-code is 
reduced.
Our findings in respect of magnitude of pricing effects are both novel and potentially 
important from the perspective of health policy in regard to DRG systems. In the Indo-
nesian system with 6.65 million treatments in 2017, 363,088 patients were placed in the 
most severe category. Simply in terms of descriptive statistics this is 10,000 less than in 
2015 (372,801 admissions in the highest severity level), but in that year only 6.16 million 
(10% fewer) cases were treated. Hence, in terms of comparing like with like, 39,468 fewer 
cases were classified as most severe in 2017 compared with what might have been expected 
based on 2015 figures. Between these 2 years the price differentials between most and least 
severe patients were reduced by 30%. It is important to note that a considerable proportion 
of the reduction is attributable to factors other than changing prices. The regression esti-
mates imply that 15,517 (84 point reduction on tariff ratio, 0.003 estimated coefficient and 
6,157,766 patients in 2015) of the 39,468 reduction is associated with the price changes. 
Very large (30%) reductions in differential prices are, therefore, associated with very small 
(0.6%) reductions in the number of patients coded as most severe. The determination of 
prices in DRG systems is complex and price setters face a number of trade-offs. If price 
differentials between high and low severity patients are too small to compensate hospitals 
for their differential costs then it may be necessary to increase prices on average to prevent 
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hospitals from running deficits. Our results show that the benefit of reducing price differ-
entials may be very small and that needs to be compared to the potential risk to the overall 
cost of the system of having to rebase all prices upwards.
The main limitation of this study is the lack of a treatment group and, therefore, depend-
ing only on variation over time to identify evidence of upcoding. Additionally, the unbal-
anced nature of the data, not all hospitals/DRG/class of care combinations have activity in 
both years, reduces the estimation sample.
The key policy implication of our study is in relation to setting DRG prices. We have 
established that price differentials for different severity DRGs are associated with changes 
in coding behaviour. This gives both an additional instrument and an additional constraint 
for policy makers in their role of price setting. When prices are viewed as a mechanism for 
transferring resources to finance healthcare, it is natural to align prices to the costs of treat-
ment. This is common practice in many DRG systems. Where there are DRGs that cor-
respond to different severities of the same condition this may imply setting a much higher 
price for the treatment of severe patients. Our results show that this may then increase the 
incidence of claims for severity. Hence, policy makers need to balance the requirements 
of transferring resources with the risks of facilitating discretionary coding and prices may 
need to differ from costs – paying more than cost for less sever patients and vice versa.
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